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Shaking the Foundations: A Reply to My Critics
† 
 
Foundations of Modern International Thought (FMIT) (Armitage 2013) is a work 
of history that poaches shamelessly on the territory of political theory, international law, 
and  International  Relations.  The  book  was  the  product  of  more  than  a  decade  of 
conversation  with  practitioners  in  these  fields—some  in  person,  many  through 
engagement  with  their  scholarship—and  I  hoped  its  conclusions,  as  well  as  its 
provocations, might continue that discussion into the future. I am therefore both flattered 
and humbled to receive responses to the book from five distinguished critics, none of 
whom is herself an historian. I must therefore begin by warmly thanking Jens Bartelson, 
Kimberly Hutchings, Edward Keene, Helen Kinsella, and Lea Ypi for reading my work 
so carefully and for offering their reactions so generously. I am also very grateful to Lisa 
Disch and Terrell Carver for giving me the opportunity to respond to their comments in 
the pages of Contemporary Political Theory.  
 When  I  first  began  working  on  FMIT,  there  were  few  glimmerings  of  the 
interdisciplinary dialogue so richly evident in this critical forum. Such work as there was 
in what I have called ‘international intellectual history’ was either very old or very new. 
Most historical study on the intellectual history of international norms, institutions, and 
theories stretched back to the founding decades of professional international law in the 
late nineteenth century or to the upsurge of internationalism in the inter-War period. After 
a long hiatus, described in the first chapter of FMIT, the turn of the twenty-first century 
witnessed the first efforts by historians of political thought to expand the boundaries of 
their field to include the international realm; that same moment also saw the emergence 
of historical studies by self-critical IR theorists and international lawyers (e.g. Tuck 1999; 
Koskenniemi  2002;  Keene  2005).  Little  of  this  work  was  yet  informed  by  the 
international and cosmopolitan strains of political theorizing that emerged in the wake of 
Rawls,  Walzer,  and  Beitz,  for  example.  The  robustness  and  sophistication  of  the 
engagements with history and theory in this forum show how far the conversation has 
moved in the past decade. 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
† Forthcoming in Contemporary Political Theory 13 (2014). 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 2 
FMIT was intended to be a more focused and more narrowly historical study of 
‘international thought in the Age of Revolutions’ treating the international dimensions of 
political  thought  from  the  Seven  Years’  War  to  the  Napoleonic  Wars.  Its  planned 
coverage was both firmly canonical—examining major thinkers such as Rousseau, Smith, 
Bentham, and Kant—and expansively contextual, dealing with non-canonical genres such 
as  treaty-collections,  diplomatic  handbooks,  and  the  earliest  histories  of  the  law  of 
nations. I then spent much of a year reading my way into contemporary IR theory and 
looking  for  points  of  contact  with  historical  work.  I  found  them  particularly  in  the 
writings  of  the  so-called  ‘English  School’  of  IR  and  in  more  recent  studies  in  a 
constructivist  and  historicist  vein,  by  Duncan  Bell,  Nicholas  Greenwood  Onuf,  and 
others.  This  engagement  might  explain  my  choice  of  the  some  of  the  figures  and 
problems treated in FMIT; it certainly helped me to decide that I wanted to intervene into 
debates in IR, as well as those in history and political theory, and contributed to the 
rethinking—and ultimately to the dissolution—of my working plan for the book. 
My original project may have been too ambitious and it soon exploded as one 
chapter expanded into a free-standing book (Armitage 2007), others appeared as separate 
articles, and I also took it upon myself to promote the emergent field of international 
intellectual  history  through  other  occasional  pieces.  Deconstruction  precedes 
reconstruction,  and  after  all  this  centrifugal  activity,  it  seemed  wise  to  collect  the 
scattered fragments to see what they added up to something more than the academic 
equivalent of Frankenstein’s monster. Kimberly Hutchings is accordingly quite correct to 
say that FMIT is not ‘a systematic engagement with specific concepts’ but instead ‘an 
eclectic collection of essays’. I am especially grateful to her for providing an excellent 
roadmap of the book’s contents, especially for IR theorists. I was especially delighted 
that  she  found  FMIT  useful  to  her  as  an  IR  theorist  and  teacher  for  its  aversion  to 
anachronism and its warnings against oversimplification. I am also glad she saw in the 
book  a  ‘challenge  to  the  eurocentrism  of  IR’—although  this  was  not  something  I 
followed through in detail, it certainly fits with more recent attempts to decenter Europe 
in accounts of international relations and international law (e.g. Acharya and Buzan 2010; 
Kayaoğlu 2010; Hobson 2012).  	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Conversely, Hutchings is right to say that my selection of case-studies could serve 
to  ‘reinscribe  a  history  of  international  thought  in  which  certain  developments  in 
Anglophone international political thinking in particular, are predominant,’ a worry Jens 
Bartelson shares. That was certainly not my intention because my selection of cases was 
not meant to confine the methods of international intellectual history to English-language 
materials—or  even,  for  that  matter,  to  European  sources—alone,  even  though  many 
British thinkers are still coin of the realm in IR courses. I would want FMIT to work 
strenuously  against  any  attempt  to  create  ‘a  new  master  narrative’  to  replace  the 
Westphalian ‘myth of 1648,’ whether pivoting around 1776 or any other date. It would 
obviously be a mistake to propose a single alternative starting-point and I consciously 
chose to drop the definite article from my title—Foundations, not The Foundations—for 
that  very  reason.  My  series  of  overlapping  and  intersecting  perspectives  was  meant 
instead to suggest multiple moments of conceptual generation (as well as degeneration) 
and to question the notion of any one teleological story of the advance toward modernity. 
I therefore wholeheartedly endorse Hutchings’s view that we need ‘pluralism’ in our 
intellectual histories of international relations.  
However,  I  wish  I  could  be  as  confident  as  Hutchings  that  ‘the  debunking 
message’ of some of the chapters ‘reads now as somewhat superfluous from the point of 
view of contemporary history of ideas in International Relations’. Historical study of 
ideas in IR has advanced greatly in recent years, as figures like Hobbes and Burke have 
been dethroned from their positions as timeless theorists rather than time-bound thinkers 
(compare Prokhovnik and Slomp 2011; Bourke 2015), but there is still a long way to go. 
As  Beate  Jahn  has  noted,  ‘studies  in  intellectual  history  will  only  overcome  their 
marginal position in our field when they link their subject area and findings explicitly to 
contemporary  debates  in  International  Relations  and  concrete  issues  in  international 
politics’ (Jahn 2010). I hope that by joining the classics to discussions of contemporary 
issues—among  them,  the  meaning  of  globalization;  legislative  authority  over  the 
executive in foreign affairs; and the procedures for declaring new states—FMIT will help 
to  inspire  more  work  on  the  intellectual  origins  of  our  current  international  order 
(compare Sluga 2013). 	 ﾠ
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Connective as well as global approaches to these questions will be essential if we 
are  to  discover  how  ideas  circulated  from  multiple  centers,  metropolitan  and  non-
metropolitan,  and  around  the  world  (Moyn  and  Sartori  2013).  Only  then  will  we 
understand  how  international  thought  became  internationalized,  as  part  of  the 
proliferation of multiple modernities and competing universalisms that accompanied the 
moving  tides  of  globalization  in  the  last  five  centuries  (compare  Armitage,  Bol,  Ge, 
Jenco,  and  Murthy  2013).  Such  work  would,  I  trust,  help  to  allay  some  of  Jens 
Bartelson’s fears about the possible effects of FMIT as propagating ‘a fairly conventional 
and at times conservative view of international relations’. I aimed only to offer examples 
of practice in international intellectual history, targeted at some of the professional pillars 
common to political theorists, IR theorists, and intellectual historians. Yet I did hope that 
the historical methods I use could also be applied to more radical strains of international 
thought:  in  this  regard,  I  am  particularly  pleased  to  see  that  historical  studies  of 
anarchism in international relations theory have now begun to blossom (Kazmi 2012; 
Prichard 2013; Kazmi 2014). 
Even more satisfying would be to have more historical work on what Bartelson 
calls  the  ‘holistic  and  universalistic  world  orders’  that  challenged  the  modern 
international system. Here Bartelson’s own recent work on visions of world order might 
be a better guide than FMIT (Bartelson 2009), although a fusion of horizons—between 
FMIT’s historicist practice and Bartelson’s critical international theory—should certainly 
be possible, as part of the emergent field of global intellectual history. It may be tempting 
to take pot-shots as sitting ducks, as Bartelson notes, but as both he and Edward Keene 
urge, there will be happier hunting if we range further afield, beyond the conventional 
canon selected for long-forgotten or obsolete disciplinary reasons. They suggest that we 
look instead to the ‘lesser and sometimes long forgotten names,’ those ‘communities of 
practitioners’ who actively constituted the international realm and who left behind less 
formal examples of international thought.  
In regard to novel sources, Keene’s questions about international thought are a 
version of Lenin’s ‘Who, whom?’: ‘[W]here was international thinking happening, and 
who  was  doing  it?’  His  first  question  might  seem  to  be  an  extension  of  my  own 
recommendation that intellectual historians should generally be more alert to space: not 	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simply the spatial dimensions of thought about the continental, oceanic, transregional and 
global,  but  more  specifically  the  concrete  locales:  the  very  rooms,  buildings,  and 
institutional settings in which thinking took place. The second question means not figures 
like Hugo Grotius, John Locke, or John Stuart Mill, whose theories arose in part from 
their practical work on behalf of European overseas trading companies (Muthu 2013); 
instead,  Keene  alerts  students  of  international  thought  to  the  producers  of  ‘medium 
thought’ (Rothschild 2005)—journalists, publicists, the editors of treaty-collections, and 
popular  historians  among  them—and  his  advice  would  also  lead  us  to  the  work  of 
diplomats,  envoys,  consuls,  missionaries  of  modernization,  and  the  functionaries  of 
international  institutions  such  as  the  League  of  Nations,  the  United  Nations,  and 
UNESCO  in  the  twentieth  and  twenty-first  centuries.  Mining  their  writings  would 
reinforce Keene’s point that ‘international thought cannot be extracted from the political 
theory  canon’.  The  concern  might  be  that  we  would  lose  political  theorists  from  the 
exercise  of  international  intellectual  history  if  we  stray  too  far  from  their  normative 
interests. 
I would very much like to see the flourishing of the interdisciplinary research 
programme  Keene  recommends—on  ‘the  relationship  between  international  thought, 
international practices and international publics’—especially if it could be tied to a more 
broadly cultural history of the international and also if it took full account of the history 
of political economy, one of the most fertile new fields in the study of international 
thought (e.g. Stern and Wennerlind 2014). Yet, if Keene wants international intellectual 
history ‘to become more than just a reshuffling of the political theory pack,’ them I 
imagine Lea Ypi and Helen Kinsella might think political theory itself would get short 
shrift from such a development. For Ypi, in particular, the question is not where to find 
international thought or its foundations, but how to find ‘the most fruitful way to engage 
historians and normative theorists in a productive intellectual exchange’. One way to do 
this, as she shows, is to use history to ‘disrupt [the] foundations’ of the contemporary 
international order, not least by exposing its complicity with empire (as Kinsella also 
argues). 
Exhibit  A  for  Ypi,  as  for  many  historically  minded  critical  theorists,  is  John 
Locke.  She  is  certainly  correct  that  Locke  would  have  had  no  interest  in  joining  ‘a 	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politically  irrelevant  controversy  which  was  moreover  philosophically  moribund’ 
regarding the freedom of the sea in the late seventeenth century: Grotius had won this 
argument over his adversary John Selden, decades earlier, as Locke’s own definition of 
the  ocean—‘that  great  and  remaining  Common  of  Mankind’  (2
nd  Treatise,  §  30)—
revealed. I remain less certain that Locke can be assimilated wholesale to the modern 
tradition of liberalism, with its combination of ‘universalistic rationality … coupled with 
a defence of the need for paternalistic interventions’. As I argued in FMIT itself, I believe 
that broadly Kantian conception of liberal foundations—which Ypi subtly reaffirms in 
her  own  contribution—cannot  be  projected  back  onto  Locke,  who  did  not  doubt  the 
capacities of non-Europeans to be fully rational, whose paternalism targeted the English 
poor rather than indigenous peoples, and who never followed Kant—at least, the early 
Kant—into anything that looks like modern racism. 
I  am  therefore  skeptical  that  Locke  himself  would  ever  have  produced  an 
‘evolutionary  defence  of  the  superiority  of  Europeans’.  Some  later  Lockeans  would 
selectively invoke him to that effect in the Early American Republic or colonial New 
South Wales, for instance, but the very same arguments were also deployed to defend 
indigenous property rights (Fitzmaurice 2014). There are undoubtedly imperial pillars 
underpinning our current global order (compare Tully 2008), but whether Locke is the 
culprit  on  whom  we  should  expend  our  critique  is  not  so  obvious,  at  least  to  me. 
Nonetheless, despite these slight disagreements, Ypi is surely quite right to insist that 
historical evidence deployed to critical ends comprises a major reason why the history of 
international thought should be of pressing concern to political theorists.  
Helen Kinsella fortifies this motive for political theorists to engage in historical 
discussion when she writes approvingly of ‘the interference with other things—concepts, 
categories, assumptions—that international intellectual history represents and foments’. 
She  contrasts  this  with  Kenneth  Waltz’s  rather  more  complacent  attachment  to  the 
‘wonderful  literature’  represented  by  the  canon  of  political  theory  from  Plato  to 
Machiavelli and beyond (Waltz and Fearon 2012). My own desire was and is definitely to 
be  ‘disruptive’  rather  than  ‘utilitarian,’  not  to  uphold  the  foundations  of  modern 
international thought but to shake them. It is in this spirit that I take Kinsella’s account of 
some of FMIT’s oversights so seriously. It is true that the book pays little attention ‘to the 	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dispossessed and the excluded’: their voices in the international conversation need to be 
recovered like the neglected sources Keene highlights in this contribution. Theirs would 
not be just-so stories but I keenly wonder what the ‘story … for the twentieth century’ 
Kinsella hopes for (along with Tracy Strong) would look like if composed by them. 
Finally, I could not agree more with her that ‘the split between the internal and external’ 
deserves much more concentrated attention from historians and theorists alike. I proposed 
that as one of the most important open questions for the field of international intellectual 
history Kinsella’s own recent work effectively points the way it might be historicized, 
and  its  politics—especially  its  gender  politics—excavated  to  critical  effect  (Kinsella 
2011) and we might follow other feminist scholars in tracing the sexing of the state to 
pursue this vital them (compare Corcoran 1997; Simons 2003). 
Kinsella generously extrapolates from my own work to conclude her remarks by 
asking ‘how international intellectual history [can] vivify questions about contemporary 
crises of thought and practice’. Her brief but provocative thoughts on Afghanistan reach 
well beyond my own cases but they reveal how the layered history of space—especially 
territorialized  space—in  such  a  contested  part  of  the  world.  Territoriality  is  rapidly 
becoming a fertile object of study in its own right among both theorists and historians 
(Elden 2013; Maier 2014). If I were writing FMIT now, I would pay much more attention 
to this dimension of the modern international order. Kinsella’s account illustrates how 
multiple layers of rule, of authority, of boundedness can co-exist without superseding one 
another. Just as there is no linear narrative of territorialization, she implies, so there is no 
consummation of Weberian statehood. The international order is always becoming, never 
being because our world is formally post-colonial but only incompletely post-imperial. 
In light of the richly engaged contributions to this forum, I now see FMIT as 
perhaps  too  formalist  and  itself  incomplete.  I  may  have  been  too  hard-edged  in  my 
attempts to excavate and upset some of the foundations of modern international thought. 
A linguistically more diverse canon; a wider range of sources; greater attention to gender 
and the subaltern; even greater intolerance of grand narratives—all these would have 
made  the  book  better  and  its  message  more  effective.  I  would  also  now  view  the 
foundations  as  more  like  those  of  ancient  Rome  in  Freud’s  famous  metaphor  from 
Civilization and Its Discontents: that is, conceived not as ‘a human habitation but as a 	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psychical  entity  with  a  similarly  long  and  copious  past’.  One  layer  does  not  replace 
another; each new building is not constructed from the stones of the ones that came 
before; but ‘all the earlier phases of development continue to exist alongside the latest 
one.  …  Where  the  Coliseum  now  stands  we  could  at  the  same  time  admire  Nero’s 
vanished golden house’ (Freud 1989: 16-18). The foundations laid down between the 
early seventeenth century and the early nineteenth century might be the equivalent of the 
Domus  Aurea;  later  conceptions  of  international  thought—metropolitan  and  colonial; 
supremacist and subaltern; anarchic and utopian—have risen up alongside them like the 
Coliseum without entirely effacing or erasing them. That may be an unsettling thought 
for those who believe history is smoothly progressive rather than messily cumulative, but 
such disruption was the real aim of my book as ‘an exercise in how to think rather than 
what to think’ (Wolfson 2013). I am lucky to have found such a congenial group of 
interlocutors  to  carry  forward  that  project  of  shaking  the  foundations  of  modern 
international thought. 
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